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PUBLIC HOUSING IN SINGAPORE: THE USE OF ENDS-BASED
REASONING IN THE QUEST FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM
I. INTRODUCTION
Singapore's monumental achievements in public housing have as-
tounded supporters and critics alike.' Law Professor W.J.M. Ricquier
of the National University of Singapore has stated, "To say that [Sin-
gapore's housing] achievements have been Herculean would scarcely be
an exaggeration." 2 Many applaud the Singapore government for trans-
forming a tiny, overcrowded, poor, slum-ridden, third world island into
a spotless haven for foreign investors within the space of twenty-five
years.3 Today, 86% of Singapore's 2.93 million people reside in Hous-
ing and Development Board4 ("HDB") flats. Eighty-one percent of
HDB residents own their flats, leaving only five percent as renters.
5
This public housing scheme is not only impressive, but arguably
necessary in an island only 646 square kilometers in size with a
resident urban population density of 9200 persons per square kilome-
ter.6 Given this density, if the government had not imposed high-rise
living on its citizens, Singapore's land may not have been able to
accommodate its population.
7
1. See, e.g., Sara G. Zwart, A Favorable Climate for Foreign Investment in Singapore: Recent Changes
in the Companies Act Hold Directors to Strict Standards of Accountability, 21 INT'L LAw. 357, 360
(1987) (citing housing as a prime achievement of Singapore's economic miracle); Terence P.
Stewart & Margaret L.H. Png, The Growth Triangle of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 23 GA.
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 8 (1993) (pointing out that as a result of its prioritization of public
housing and economic planning, Singapore has graduated from the ranks of a developing nation),
2. W.J.M. Ricquier, Public Housing Law in Singapore, 8 URB. LAW & POL'Y 313, 313 (1987).
3. See, &g., Lui Thai Ker, Overview, in HOUSING A NATION: 25 YEARS OF PUBLIC HOUSING
IN SINGAPORE 1 (Aline K. Wong & Stephen H.K. Yeh eds., 1985). This book was published for
the Housing and Development Board ("HDB"). Although it is a very useful source of factual
information, some of the descriptions of the system may be biased. It appears, however, that the
HDB endeavored to produce a critical analysis of its housing system. The book is meant to "give
an overall picture of the multiple functions of HDB, what it has accomplished, the reasons for
its achievements, the physical and social impacts, and the problems and prospects of the immediate
future." Aline K. Wong & Stephen H.K. Yeh, Editors' Preface to HOUSING A NATION, supra, at
vii.
4. The HDB is Singapore's more powerful equivalent of the United States Housing and Urban
Development Board. The HDB was created statutorily by the Housing and Development Act,
SING. STAT. ch. 129, § 13 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 50-57 for a fuller discussion
of the Housing and Development Act.
5. Hous. & DEv. BD., FACTS ON PUBLIC HOUSING IN SINGAPORE 2 (July 1, 1995) [hereinafter
HDB FACTS].
6. Id. Urban density is total population divided by total land area excluding catchment areas,
military grounds, cemeteries, and agricultural land. Id
7. Cf infra text accompanying notes 11-21 (describing the housing situation prior to the
creation of the HIB).
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Despite the seemingly spectacular success in public housing, many
fear that the long arm of the Singapore government will reach into all
aspects of economic and social life. One commentator noted:
[The omnipresence of a paternalistic government indicates that
[Singapore) is in danger of losing its soul. In a world where
personal freedoms often give fundamental definition to one's ex-
istence, the leadership of Singapore appears bent on subordinating
such freedoms in favor of its national agenda aimed at economic
success.
8
Critics view Singapore as an authoritarian nation whose government
rules with a heavy hand.9
Because of its apparent successes, one might consider the Singapore
system an attractive model upon which other countries like the United
States could base new low-income housing programs. The United
States should not look to Singapore's housing system as a model,
however, without considering the significant social costs this appar-
ently successful system has imposed on its citizens. To that end, this
Recent Development will discuss both Singapore's undeniable housing
achievements and the social and economic costs of these achievements.
Part H will describe in detail the history and implementation of
Singapore's public housing program. Part HI will analyze the tangible
achievements of the program. Finally, Part IV will explore both justifica-
tions for and criticisms of the public housing program, drawing upon
theories used to analyze United States urban housing policies. In doing
so, this Recent Devlopment will juxtapose "ends-based" reasoning with
"means-based" reasoning. Ends-b.ased reasoning is a form of reasoning
that morally justifies a system by the system's outcomes. Critics of
systems justified by ends-based reasoning can argue either that the
systems do not produce sufficient results to justify the methods used
or, employing means-based reasoning, that the methods used to achieve
those results were not just.10 It becomes apparent that the Singapore
government has employed ends-based reasoning to justify its housing
program.
8. Thomas Michael Hird, Public Housing in Singapore: An Analysis of Singapore's Housing
and Development Board and a Discussion of the Real Meaning of Its Success 1 (1987) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Lewis Center International Law Library).
9. See C.M. TURNBULL, A HISTORY OF SINGAPORE: 1819-1975, at 325 (1977) (stating that
"[d]emocracy was the first casualty to the independent government's success"). Also one can
scarcely forget how the caning of Michael Faye made international headlines. See, ag., Caning in
Singapore Stoking Political Fires, LAs VEGAs REv. J., Apr. 25, 1994, at 4A.
10. See infra notes 190-192 and accompanying text for a fuller description of ends-based and
means-based reasoning.
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II. HISTORY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SINGAPORE'S
PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM
A. Singapore's Historical Housing Problems
Singapore's housing problems arose as early as the establishment of
British rule in 1819.11 The economy was generally in a terrible state,
and the British colonial government had "adopted a laissez-faire policy
towards housing and did not consider it as part of the responsibilities
of the Government" to provide public housing to the citizenry.12 A
dramatic increase in immigration from Malaysia and surrounding coun-
tries in the early twentieth century,13 which reached epidemic propor-
tions in the late 1940s and early 1950s, compounded the problems.
14
The Singapore government had established the Singapore Improve-
ment Trust ("SIT") to improve housing conditions, but its programs
were permanently interrupted by World War II. "By the end of the
War, tens of thousands of people were living in huts made of attap,
old wooden boxes, rusty corrugated iron sheets, and other such sal-
vaged material. The bulk of Singapore's populace lived in congested
squatter settlements with 'no sanitation, water or any elementary health
facilities."' 15 Singapore's economic condition worsened in the 1960s
due to the deteriorating political relationship between Singapore and
Malaysia, as well as Britain's military withdrawal from the Singapore-
Malaysia region.' 6 Internally, the country faced high rates of unemploy-
ment, labor unrest, and political instability.17 According to one study,
a decade after World War II, 84% of Singapore households consisted
of one room or less.' 8 Many of these households were "shophouses,"
each housing an average of thirty extended family members. 19 The
HDB described the living conditions at that time as follows:
Living conditions were characterised by makeshift shelters, over-
crowding, appalling environmental conditions, poor maintenance
and a general lack of essential services.
11. RIAz HASSAN, FAMILIES IN FLATS 3 (1977).
12. Teh Cheang Wan, Public Housing, in MODERN SINGAPORE 171, 172 (Ooi Jin-Bee & Chiang
Hai Ding eds., 1969).
13. HASSAN, supra note 11.
14. CHING-LING TAI, HOUSING POLICY AND HIGH RISE LIVING: A STUDY OF SINGAPORE's
PUBLIC HOUSING 43 (1989).
15. Id. at 44-45 (quoting PECK LENG SEow, NEW LIFE IN NEw HOMES 11 (1965))
16. Hird, supra note 8, at 8.
17. Id. at 7.
18. HASSAN, supra note 11, at 4 (citing a study in GOH KENG SWE, UR3AN INCOME AND
HOUSING (1956)).
19. Shophouses are households that also serve as commercial store premises. TAI, .inpra note
14, at 46.
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Electric lighting was not available in many places; people had
to rely on kerosene lamps, candles and carbide lamps. Insufficient
piped water often resulted in the sharing of a common tap or well
among several households. A modern sanitation system was lack-
ing. In many places, latrines haphazardly erected over drains and
waste discharged directly into the water courses were the main
sources of widespread environmental pollution. Several low-lying
areas were prone to flooding due to insufficient major drain out-
lets. Most of the existing drains were of inadequate size and were
either badly silted or clogged up with debris and waste, creating
an environmental health hazard.
20
At the same time, there were widespread housing shortages and
homelessness. The HDB estimated that it would have to build up to
120,000 units in its first ten years to meet the immediate housing
needs of the public.
21
One should bear in mind, however, that a negative characterization
of the conditions preceding the housing program was essential to
Singapore's ends-based justification of the program. Characterizations
of social situations are often merely functions of the ideological and
political predispositions of those people making the characterizations.
The HDB may have characterized the preexisting condition in Singa-
pore as being so bad because it had a political agenda involving the
idea that "good" housing meant cleaner, stricter, more uniform hous-
ing.
22
B. Making Housing a Political Priority
Because of the egregious housing conditions in the two decades
following World War II, the government made public housing a top
political priority and a central part of the government's plan to reju-
venate the economy. The People's Action Party ("PAP"), who assumed
power in 1959, seized the housing issue as a political platform, viewing
housing "as a crucial ingredient to immediate and lasting success.
23
The PAP knew it had to promise the people a better lifestyle to ensure
its lasting political power. The previous ruling party had failed to
achieve success with the SIT. The PAP capitalized on their failure and
20. Yao Chee Liew et al., Infrastructure, in HOUSrNG A NATION, supra note 3, at 113, 114.
21. TMi, supra note 14, at 46.
22. Cf WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 20-23 (1987); Roy L. Brooks,
The Ecology of Inequality: The Rise of the African-American Underclass, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 1,
1-6 (1991) (observing a similar phenomenon in the United States where proponents of color
blind housing policies, owing to their political dispositions, were nor candid about the pathologies
of the urban ghetto and expounded a less than accurate picture of the ghetto).
23. Hird, supra note 8, at 3.
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outlined bold housing policies and goals to win the election of 1959.24
"It secured enough seats to dominate the Assembly that year and has
continued to dominate ever since. 25 Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew
continued to focus on public housing, stating on the eve of his election
in 1972 that he would raise the HDB's annual building target from
20,000 to .30,000 units and make Singapore into the best metropolis
in the tropics.26 He also stressed that he would do away with slums in
the next ten years so "each of you can own your home and have your
family brought up in healthy and gracious surroundings." 27 As one
sociologist noted:
Singapore's public housing programs are envisaged as integral
parts of national development policies. Consequently, public hous-
ing has not only accelerated urban development and redevelop-
ment, and enhanced social welfare, but, with an ever increasing
proportion of the population drawn into its ambit, has become a
social barometer of the nation as well.
28
Interestingly, the fact that housing became a hot political issue seems
to reinforce the idea that the description of existing housing problems
may have been tainted by political bias. 29 The lack of objectivity as to
how much change the housing policies produced undercuts the credi-
bility of any ends-based justification of the system.30
As part of making housing a national priority, both the SIT and
HDB created extensive statutory plans for implementing the program.
In 1958, the SIT unsuccessfully attempted to implement a "Master
Plan" for residential and urban development.31 This plan proved unable
to adjust to the changing socioeconomic conditions after the PAP
gained control of the government in 1959.32 In 1967, the PAP adopted
a new "Concept Plan."33 It called for the rapid expansion of the urban
24. Id. at 16; Tai, supra note 14, at 106-07.
25. TAI, supra note 14, at 106-07.
26. Id. at 109 (citing STrAITS TIMES, Sept. 2, 1972).
27. TAI, supra note 14, at 109 (citing STRaITS TIMES, Dec. 23, 1976).
28. YUa-MAN YEUNG, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND URBAN TRANSFORMATION IN
SINGAPORE 169 (1973).
29. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
30. This is because ends-based justifications presuppose that the beneficial ends are actually
achieved. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
31. The plan contained a set of 53 maps of the various parts of Singapore and laid out how,
over the next 20 years, the land should be developed for residential and commercial use. The
plan called for the clearing of unsatisfactory dwellings, construction of over 10,000 new dwellings
per year, and decentralization of the densest urban areas. TAi, supra note 14, at 51-52.
32. See Teo Siew Eng, New Towns Planning and Development in Singapore, 8 THIRD WORLD PLAN.
REV. 252, 253 (1986) (observing that "lilt was necessary to free public development from the
inflexibility of the legal restrictions of the Master Plan to meet the demand for housing and
employment").
33. Id. at 253-54.
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center and the creation of high-density residential areas surrounding
the urban center. The Concept Plan was also known as the "ring plan"
because it envisaged a ring of residential areas surrounding a central
commercial district, connected by a Mass Rapid Transit. 34 The plan
called for commercial development, an airport transportation link, and
construction of residential structures to accommodate a population of
3.7 million by the year 2030.
35
C. The Enabling Legislation
One of Singapore's initial steps in implementing its housing pro-
gram was to enact legislation granting the government broad takings
power, allowing the government extreme control over the use of private
property, and severely restricting private property rights. The govern-
ment obtained the power to implement its bold housing policies
pursuant to two specific legislative acts: The Land Acquisition Act
36
and the Housing and Development Act.37 Enacted in 1967, the Land
Acquisition Act gave the government broad takings power. Prior to
1965, Singapore was a constituent of Malaysia,38 whose constitution
contained a takings clause similar to the takings clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 39 After its independence
from Malaysia, Singapore declared this takings provision inoperable °
and summarily rejected subsequent recommendations to reenact it.
4'
By doing so the government signalled its readiness to take an active
part in the redevelopment and renewal of existing privately owned
34. Id.
35. Id; see also TAI, supra note 14, at 53. Singapore's current population is 2.93 million. HDB
FACTS, supra note 5, at 2. Singapore had a population of 1.7 million in 1961 and 2.01 million
in 1970. Ong Wee Hock, The Economics of Growth and Survival, SINGAPORE: NAT'L TRADES UNION
CONGRESS 1, 8 (1978). In 1965, Singapore began to implement strict population control policies.
Hird, supra note 8, at 37; see also infra text accompanying notes 147-153 for a more detailed
description of these policies. From 1967 to 1984, Singapore's population increased at an average
annual rate of 1.7%. The population in 1984 was 2.5 million. Ker, supra note 3, at 35. Since
then it has apparently continued to increase at a similar, if not slightly higher rate. HDB FACTS,
supra note 5, at 2 (author used current population statistics to estimate rate of growth from 1984
to 1996).
36. Land Acquisition Act, SING. STAT. ch. 152 (1985).
37. Housing and Development Act, SING. STAT. ch. 129 (1985).
38. Singapore was a constituent of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965. Ricquier, supra note 2, at
316.
39. Ricquier, supra note 2, at 316. Article 13 of Malaysia's Constitution stated: "No person
shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law. No law shall provide for the compulsory
acquisition of property without adequate compensation." Ricquier, supra note 2, at 316. The fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution states: "IN[or shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
40. Section 6 of the Republic of Singapore Independence Act of 1965 provided: "Article 13
shall cease to have effect." Id at 316.
41. Id. at 316-17.
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land. This is another example of the ends-based analysis employed by
the Singapore government. Unlike the United States government, who
was concerned with the procedural dangers of government takings,
42
the Singapore government was willing to subordinate procedural pro-
tections in order to implement bold housing policies.4 3
The Land Acquisition Act gave the government extremely broad
power to acquire and redevelop privately owned land. It's stated pur-
pose was "to provide for the acquisition of land for public and certain
other specified purposes, the assessment of compensation to be made
on account of such acquisition and for purposes connected therewith."
44
Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act allowed workers to enter land
and "do all . . . acts necessary" to determine whether the land could
be used by the government 45 "[wlhenever it appear[ed] to the Presi-
dent that land in any locality [was] likely to be needed." 46 It, however,
required the government to give notice to owners before acquiring
their land and provided for an appeals process.4 7 The Land Acquisition
Act also provided for the following method of determining compensa-
tion for acquired land:
In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for
land acquired under this Act, the Board shall ... take considera-
tion of the following matters and no others:
(a) the market value as at 30th November 1973, or the mar-
ket value as at the date of the publication of the notification
under section 3 (1) ... whichever is the lowest;
(b) any increase in the value of any other land of the person
interested likely to accrue from the use to which the land
acquired will be put;
(c) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at
the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land by
reason of severing that land from his other land.48
42. See supra note 38.
43. This is evidenced by the broad scope of powers granted to the HDB by the Land
Acquisition Act and the Housing and Development Act. See infra notes 44-5 7 and accompanying
text.
44. Land Acquisition Act, SING. STAT. ch. 152, preamble (1985).
45. Chapter 152, § 3(1)(c).
46. Chapter 152, § 5(lXa), (b) & (c).
47. Chapter 152, §§ 8-12, 19-31.
48. Chapter 152, § 33(lXa), (b) & (c). Section 33(1) further states that the HDB may considerv
(d) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of the Collector's
caking possession of the land by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other
property, whether movable or immovable, in.any other manner;
(e) if, in consequence of the acquisition, he is compelled to change his residence or place
of business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to that change; and
(0 if, in consequence of the acquisition, any reissue of title is necessary, the fees or costs
relating to survey, issue and registration of title, stamp duty and such other costs or
1997 / Public Housing in Singapore
Interestingly, this provision placed an upper limit on compensation for
acquired land. Subsequent provisions reduced the amount even further.
Section 33 of the Land Acquisition Act set forth detailed descriptions
of situations in which the government could pay less than market value
for land, including, for example, cases where the land had been affected
by a natural disaster or where land value had been increased by neces-
sity of building roads, drains, gas lines, and other utilities on that land.
In addition, apparently the fair market value provision of the statute
was merely a guideline that the HDB could consider in assessing com-
pensation. It appears that the legislature intended to leave the question
of compensation only cursorily answered and to look to judicial entities
to define the limits on government takings.
49
The Housing and Development Act invested the government with
further authority to implement the housing program. 50 Most sig-
nificantly, the Housing and Development Act created the HDB and
invested it with extensive power to create and implement housing
policies. Part III of the Housing and Development Act detailed the
HDB's responsibilities to acquire, clear, develop, and manage lands
necessary for housing development." It also established other HDB
fees
which may reasonably be incurred.
49. The government stated its intention to "leave open the door for litigation and ultimately
for adjudication by the Courts as to what is or is not to be adequate compensation." 25
SINGAPORE PARLImENTARY DEB. 1053-54 (1966). It is not apparent, however, whether courts
ever did clearly define the limits of compensation.
50. Section 13 of the Housing and Development Act provides:
Subject as hereinafter provided, it shall be the function and duty of the Board-
(a) to prepare and execute proposals, plans and projects for-
(i) the erection, conversion, improvement and extension of any building for sale,
lease, rental or other purpose;
(ii) the clearance and redevelopment of slum and urban areas;
(iii) the development or redevelopment of areas designated by the Minister;
(iv) the development of rural or agricultural areas for the resettlement of persons
displaced by operations of the Board or other resettlement projects approved by the
Minister;
(b) to manage all lands, houses and buildings or other property vested in or belonging
to the Board;
(c) to carry out all investigations and the surveys necessary for the performance of the
functions and duties of the Board;
(d) to provide loans, with the approval of the Minister, to enable persons to purchase-
(i) any developed land; or
(ii) any other land belonging to the Board for which planning permission to develop
has been obtained under the Planning Act,
or any part thereof upon a mortgage of that land;
(e) to do all such other matters and things as are necessary for the exercise or perform-
ance of all or any of the functions and duties of the board.
Housing and Development Act, SING. STAT. ch. 129, § 13 (1985).
51. Chapter 129, § 13(a)-(e).
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duties, defined HDB member eligibility and election requirements,
and detailed financing procedures.
52
The Housing and Development Act severely restricted the rights
generally associated with private ownership of property. Section 46(1)
of the Housing and Development Act allowed the HDB, "with the
approval of the Minister, [to] sell any developed land or part thereof."'53
Section 47 absolutely prohibited private ownership of HDB flats for
appreciation or rental income. A person could not purchase a flat if she
or her spouse "[was] the owner of any other flat, house, building or
land or ha[d] an estate or interest therein; or . . . ha(d] at any time
within 30 months immediately prior to the date of making an appli-
cation . . . sold any flat, house, building or land of which [s]he was
the owner .... 54
In addition, the Housing and Development Act required owners to
obtain prior consent from the HDB before transferring any property
interest. 55 It also invested the HDB with extensive eviction powers.
Section 56 permitted the HDB, in a variety of situations, to acquire
any flat compulsorily. For example, the HDB could reacquire a flat
whenever: The owner had a legal interest in any other flat, house,
building, or land; the flat was being used for any purpose other than
provided by the lease; the owner permitted any person other than an
authorized occupier to reside in the flat; the owner failed to perform
any condition in the lease;56 the owner made a misrepresentation of a
material fact, "whether innocently or otherwise," relating to the pur-
chase of the flat; the owner underletted or parted with possession
52. Section 66 of the Housing and Development Act states:
(1) The Board may, from time to time, for the purposes of this Act, raise loans from the
Government ....
(2) The Board shall pay interest on such loans at such rate and at such times, and shall
make such provisions for the mode and time or times of repayment of principal ....
(3) The Board may, where the approval of the Minister has been obtained to borrow money
under subsection (1), raise the money by-
(a) mortgage;
(b) charge, whether legal or equitable, on any property vested in the Board or on any
revenue receivable by the Board under this or any other Act; or
(c) the creation and issue of debenture stock.
Chapter 129, § 66(1)-(3).
53. Chapter 129, § 46(1).
54. Chapter 129, § 47.
55. Chapter 129, §§ 49-52.
56. Lease provisions can be very broad and easily breached. For example, one standard covenant
states that the lessee must promise
not to do any act in the flat or common areas of the building or use or suffer or permiit the
[same] to be used for any purpose which may be illegal or immoral or which may cause a
nuisance, annoyance or disturbance to the owners, lessees or occupiers of the other flats
comprised in the building or in the neighborhood.
Ricquier, supra note 2, at 321.
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without obtaining prior consent from the HDB; or the flat was not
being occupied by the minimum number of persons.
57
D. Financing the Programs
The HDB financed the housing system through a combination of
low-rate government loans, government subsidies, and revenues raised
from HDB operations."s From 1960 to 1994, the HDB's total capital
expenditure increased from $10 million to $6.6 billion,'59 and total
revenue expenditure increased from $15 to $1.8 billion.6° Between 1992
and 1994, the HDB operated on a net deficit consisting of a housing
operations deficit offset by a surplus from non-housing operations.61 In
1994, housing operations produced a deficit of $737 million while
non-housing operations produced a surplus of $510 million.
62
The HDB financed its budgeted capital expenditure through two
different kinds of government loans: The housing development loan, a
60-year loan at 7.75% interest, used to finance HDB development
programs and operations; 63 and the mortgage financing loan, a 10-year
loan at 6% interest, used to finance mortgage loans given by the HDB
to purchasers of flats.64 From 1975 to 1994, government loans to the
57. Other situations in which the HDB could reacquire a flat included: The HDB felt the
owner had ceased to occupy the flat; the owner had ceased to be a citizen of Singapore; the
owner did not pay rent for three months; the owner or any occupier had been convicted of an
offense related to destroying any property bought or leased from the HDB; or the owner or any
occupier had been convicted of an offense relating to immigration, that is, giving food, shelter,
or assisting any illegal alien. Housing and Development Act, SIG. STAT. ch. 129, § 56(1)(a)-(n)
(1985).
58. Ker, supra note 3, at 6. HDB operating revenue consists of the sale of flats, rental of flats,
mortgages, rental of commercial properties, rental of industrial properties, sale of commercial
properties, rental of land, car parks, markets and hawker centers, and other miscellaneous revenue.
HDB FAcTS, supra note 5, at 4.
59. Ker, supra note 3, at 6; see also HDB FAcrs, supra note 5, at 4. Dollar amounts refer to
Singapore dollars. Years refer to fiscal years. For example, "1994" refers to fiscal year 1994-95.
Capital expenditure is the expenditure of money raised from government loans and subsidies. Id.
60. Id. Operating expenditure is the expenditure of money raised from HDB operations. Id.
61. The net deficit for 1992, 1993, and 1994 was $292 million, $129 million, and $227 mil-
lion, respectively. HDB FACTS, supra note 5, at 4. Housing operations include the sale of flats,
rental of flats, mortgage financing upgrading of flats, improvements to sold flats, lease admini-
stration, and other activities supporting the building of communities. Non-housing operations
include the rental of commercial properties, rental of industrial properties, sale of commercial
properties, rental of land, carparks, markets and hawker centers, and miscellaneous operations.
Id.
62. Id,
63. Loke Kum Cheng et al., Resource Planning, in HoUSING A NATION, supra note 3, at 30,
34. In 1994, the HDB borrowed $2.1 billion worth of housing development loans and owed
$8.5 billion on outstanding housing development loans. HDB FAcrs, supra note 5, at 4-5.
64. Cheng, supra note 63, at 34. In 1994, the HDB borrowed $4.8 billion worth of mortgage
financing loans and owed $17.7 billion on outstanding mortgage financing loans. That year, the
HDB granted $6.1 billion worth of mortgage loans to flat purchasers. HDB FACTs, supra note
5, at 4.
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HDB represented between approximately 20% and 40% of total gov-
ernment capital expenditure.
65
The HDB also received direct subsidies from the government. From
1975 to 1994, the HDB received between $30 million and $120 mil-
lion in public housing grants each year. This generally represented 1%
to 2% of total government expenditure.66 The government also subsi-
dized infrastructure and resettlement programs and provided grants to
town councils for estate maintenance. This expenditure, combined with
the public housing grants, represented between 6% and 9% of total
government expenditure between 1989 and 1994.67 The HDB ob-
served that "[tlhe subsidy (was] kept to such a low level by virtue of
the Board's judicious financial management of revenue derived from
commercial and industrial developments." In addition, under the
Home Ownership Scheme established in 1964, Singaporeans could use
their compulsory savings in the Central Provident Fund ("CPF"), Sin-
gapore's equivalent of the United States Social Security Fund, to help
repay loans obtained from the HDB for the purchase of homes.
69
Although it is clear that the HDB received funding through a
combination of government loans, subsidies and operating revenues,
the connection between ownership schemes, property appreciation, and
the HDB budget calls for further clarification. The selling price of
HDB flats was not strictly based on market price. In other words, price
did not merely reflect consumer demands. Although the available
information on the exact pricing method of units is quite limited,
pricing was apparently based on a combination of factors including
existing housing needs, available funding, and construction costs. 70
The HDB also factored in the objective of providing housing at sub-
sidized costs. Housing prices were generally lower than both uncon-
trolled market prices and construction costs, resulting in a deficit from
the operating costs of the sale of flats .71 In addition, the HDB
provided rental flats at subsidized rates, which created rental deficits. 72
65. Ker, supra note 3, at 6. In 1993, for example, total government expenditure, calculated
from combining operating and development expenditures, was $16.6 billion, and total housing
loan expenditure was $3.9 billion. That year, housing loan expenditure represented approximately
24% of total government expenditure. HDB FACTS, supra note 5, at 5.
66. HDB FACTs, supra note 5, at 5.
67. Id.
68. Ker, supra note 3, at 6.
69. Cheng, supra note 63, at 34. See infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the CPE
70. Chong Kim Chang et al., Housing Schemes: Policies and Procedures, in HOUSING A NATION,
supra note 3, at 230, 232-33.
71. In 1993 and 1994, for example, the HDB lost $518 million and $340 million respectively
on the sale of flats. HDB FACTS, supra note 5, at 4.
72. Rental deficits resulted in net losses from rental flats in the amount of $58 million in
1993 and $119 million in 1994. HDB FACTS, supra note 5, at 4.
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The HDB also experienced net losses from maintenance and upgrading
programs. Net gains from non-housing activities, however, substan-
tially offset the total operating net losses experienced from housing
programs.73 The portion of government loans and grants not spent on
operating costs subsidize the mortgage financing programs. As stated
above, the HDB made mortgages widely available to HDB residents
to finance ownership of the homes. It closely tied mortgage interest
rates to CPF returns, setting them at 0.1% above the floating CPF
interest rate.74 Rates were kept so low, presumably, so that residents
could use their compulsory savings to meet mortgage principal repay-
ments and interest payments.
This mortgage interest rate subsidy program, however, did not
account for all government funds injected into HDB operations. If the
HDB simply mortgaged the units, why was there a positive outflow
of cash? The answer is not immediately apparent. The HDB spent
$4.8 billion financing mortgage loans in 1994.75 At least part of the
spending went to subsidizing the down payments of low-income fami-
lies. The HDB had a separate expenditure account for development
programs and operations. In 1994, it spent $2.2 billion on construc-
tion of new units and operations.7 6 While some government funds
clearly financed new construction and current mortgage programs,
exactly how the mortgage finance funding was spent is not clear.
E. Acquiring Land
Having obtained broad takings power from the extensive Land
Acquisition Act, the government began to rapidly acquire public land
to convert to public housing. By the end of 1973, the government had
acquired more than half of the land in Singapore, and by 1979, it had
acquired approximately two-thirds.7 7 The 1973 amendment to the
Land Acquisition Act permitted the government to acquire land at the
lower of either the 1973 market value or the government-determined
market value posted in the Gazette. Consequently, the government
acquired and cleared squatter land, paying significantly less than mar-
ket value. Critics have commented on the apparent unfairness of this
provision, stating that "Singapore ha[d] experienced an astronomical
rise in property prices and the 1973 market value [was] likely to be a
73. The HDB owns a number of properties that it leases and sells to commercial and industrial
parties. Total revenues from these activities in 1993 and 1994 were $484 million and $510 mil-
lion, respectively. Id.
74. Id. at 12.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Hird, supra note 8, at 34.
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small amount compared with the actual market value."78 The govern-
ment, however, saw things differently:
These basic changes to the law ... were necessary to curb specu-
lation in land and limit the cost of acquisition to the level of
compensation for its existing use or Master Plan Zoning. The
majority of private lands comprised dilapidated properties or ne-
glected land where squatters had mushroomed. The government
therefore saw no reason why these owners should enjoy the greatly
enhanced land values over the years without any effort put in by
them.
79
Even the government's subsequent pledges to pay up to market
value for the land80 denied owners the land's true value. The Singapore
government based market value on either the existing use or zoning
of the land, whichever was lower. "No account [was] taken of any
potential value of the land for any other more intensive use. This
ignore[d] whatever potential the land may have [had] for future devel-
opment if the land ha[d] been zoned for a restrictive use, as for example
'public open space.' Thus, land zoned 'Agriculture' . . . at the time of
acquisition [was] valued as such."8'
Critics of Singapore's land acquisition policies also express concern
over the lack of public scrutiny over the acquisitions.8 2 Although the
Land Acquisition Act required the HDB to give proper notice to
individuals whose land was to be acquired and provided for an internal
appeal process, the notice requirements only applied to "persons inter-
ested," meaning those who had a legal interest in the property. In
addition, appeals were not public proceedings.8 3 The HDB mislead-
ingly described itself as having "instituted a very meticulous process
of scrutiny to prevent abuse of power conferred by [the Land Acquisi-
tion] Act. '8 4 It only cited the provisions granting prior notice to the
78. Ricquier, supra note 2, at 317.
79. Cheng, supra note 63, at 41.
80. In 1981, the government promised to pay up to market value or $600,000, whichever
was less, to owner-occupiers of residential property acquired for government use. Id.
81. Id
82. See Hird, supra note 8, at 33 (observing that "the Planning Department (an agency of the
government) decides on what land will be suitable for various purposes so that private landowners
have no recourse from adverse decisions"); see also Ricquier, supra note 2, at 317.
83. According to experts:
A final point to note about the basic acquisition process is the absence of public participation
.... There is no procedure for a public inquiry. Indeed the entire planning system, which
has transformed the country's physical and social environment in the space of two decades,
operates without any formal element of public participation.
Ricquier, supra note 2, at 317-18. Ricquier stated in a footnote, however, that "[olccasionally,
major projects may be the subject of public debate. ... Id. at 331. Even so, the "Land
Acquisition Act, contains no provision for public participation in any form." Id
84. Cheng, supra note 63, at 42. The HDB also referred to the "restriction" that land could
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owner and the internal appeal process. It did not address the larger
"public inquiry" issue.8 5 The apparent lack of procedural protections is
further evidence that the government employed ends-based reasoning,
ignoring, at least for the time being, the danger of abuse inherent in
the means employed for acquiring land.
R Resettlement and Renewal
Once the government acquired sufficient land, it began clearing
squatters and owner-occupiers from the land and relocating them to
temporary residences during the construction of the housing units. The
HDB formed the Resettlement Department to undertake this task.
8 6
After the Department completed a census survey of the land site, it
categorized the existing occupiers as farmers, residential families, single
persons, commercial and industrial occupiers, or absentee homeowners
in order to determine resettlement benefits. People verified their stat-
uses by presenting various forms of identification including certificates
of business registration, trade licenses, and public utilities bills.
8 7
Although resettlement amounted to a massive ousting of people
from their homes, the government attempted to make the transition
easier by providing reasonable compensation for resettlement. Compen-
sation for resettlement varied throughout the years as the Resettlement
Department analyzed and refined existing practices. Concerned that
resettlement might erupt into unrest as it did in Tokyo during the
resettlement for the development of the Narita Airport, the Singapore
government made a concerted effort to continually scrutinize its reset-
tlement practices.88 Between 1964 and 1979, the HDB offered a series
only be acquired for a "public" purpose. This restriction did not serve as a real gate-keeper against
random public takings. The government could simply assert any public purpose.
85. In addition to acquiring private land, the government redeveloped public land for housing
use. It developed beach land, cleared marshes and agricultural areas, and even redeveloped burial
grounds. Such aggressive reclamation did not go without its own fair share of criticism. Rory
Fonseca, professor of Architecture at the University of Singapore, observed:
In a situation where land is in short supply and pressures for expansion are dominant,
demands for land are met by substituting one economic use with another. Usually, uses with
a potential for higher yields succeed marginal ones. This suggests a burst of urban renewal
activity, that swamps, lagoons and foreshore areas will be reclaimed, agriculture displaced,
and rural zones encroached upon, and this is precisely what is happening in Singapore.
Rory Fonseca, Planning and Land Use, in SINGAPORE: SOCIUrY IN TRANSITION 221 (Riaz Hassan
ed., 1976).
86. Through a series of changing programs, the Department resettled 42,954 squatters and
owners at a total cost of $32.8 million from 1961 to 1970, 118,561 squatters and owners at a
total cost of $420.1 million from 1971 to 1980, and 67,346 squatters and owners at a total cost
of $726.4 million from 1981 to 1984. Lim Hoon Yong, Resettlement: Policy, Process and Impact, in
HOUSING A NATION, supra note 3, at 305, 316. Although specific statistics are not available for
the years after 1984, clearance and resettlement apparently has continued to increase dramatically.
See id,
87. Cheng, supra note 63, at 43-44.
88. Yong, supra note 86, at 305. Yong also noted:
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of replacement housing options to farmers and non-farming squatters.89
In 1975, in order to decrease the number of squatters in shophouses,
the HDB began to offer displaced shopkeepers suitable accommoda-
tions in strategic locations within the central urban area at comparably
low rents. Although this new policy increased shopkeeper resettlement
from 20% to 40%, it plainly did not meet with success. Central
location was not a great incentive to shopkeepers who could no longer
compete against more modern entrepreneurs.90
In 1981, the Department revised resettlement policies in several
ways. It began offering fixed allowances to compensate for disturbance
and transportation. It offered each residential household a $2,000
allowance. Farmers received an additional $260 allowance.91 In addi-
tion, residential households could opt for an HDB flat at the low rent
of $33.33 per month for three years or the low down payment of $200.
Shopkeepers could choose either a cash grant of $58,500 or a new
business in an HDB-designated location.92 Analysts have applauded
Singapore's attempt to make the unsettling process of relocation as fair
as possible to ousted dwellers.93
Singapore's resettlement policies may appear to reflect means-based
reasoning in the sense that the government was concerned with the
fairness of its relocation practices.94 It is unclear, however, whether the
scrutiny of the policies arose from an actual desire to make the process
fair or simply from a desire to avoid unrest.95
The Narita people are not exceptional. Most people are apprehensive of being resettled,
irrespective of their nationality and culture because they need to make adjustments in their
new environments which may affect them economically and socially. Resettlement, therefore,
has often been perceived by the affected population with suspicion, which in certain
instances, have erupted into violence or physical resistance through political agitation.
Id.
89. Prior to 1964, non-farming squatters could opt for free basic housing in agricultural
settlements or for free HDB flats. Farmers received land with free basic housing in agricultural
settlements plus compensation for improvements. The HDB abandoned this policy when it found
that most of the people opted for houses in agricultural settlements. In 1964, as industrialization
and urbanization increased, the Department introduced "Replacement Rates." The HDB offered
$1,000 per acre of agricultural land to induce those resettled in agricultural settlements to move
to HDB flats. This program also proved to be unsatisfactory because farmers felt the compensation
was insufficient and preferred cash to land. In 1971, to encourage more urban migration, the
HDB increased farmers' compensation by 100% and offered either a free three-room HDB flat
or the cash equivalent of one. The HDB ceased offering houses in agricultural settlements all
together in 1979. Id. at 309-14.
90. Id. at 313.
91. Id. at 315.
92. Id.
93. Experts note that "[t]he statistics bear testimony to the achievement of the government's
dual objectives of freeing lands from encumbrance for development while upgrading the standard
of housing for slum dwellers through the process of relocation." Id. at 319.
94. See id.
95. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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G. Constructing the Public Housing Units
As soon as the HDB had cleared enough land, it embarked upon its
ambitious building program. By 1995, the HDB had built an impres-
sive 721,881 units.96 At the outset, however, it faced daunting chal-
lenges in preparation for such a massive undertaking.
Specifically, the HDB had to assemble and manage the materials
required to build the housing units. It began by establishing several
granite-crushing plants. By 1982, it had built four plants with several
hundred thousand tons capacity.97 The HDB arranged with the Na-
tional Iron and Steel Mills Ltd. to bulk purchase construction items at
low cost.98 In addition, the HDB had to ensure an adequate supply of
labor.99 It implemented a program to socially engineer the Singapore
work force to meet construction labor needs. It drew pre-high school
age youths and immediately immersed them in construction training
programs. These programs included training in both skilled and un-
skilled construction labor and continue to appropriate 1500-2000
youths annually. 100
The HDB organized the public housing complexes into "new towns."101
Generally, about 41% of new town land went to housing develop-
ments, 10% to schools, 20% to industry, 4% to the town center, 3%
to institutional use, 7% to sports and open space, and 7% to roads and
other infrastructural facilities. Among the housing units were several
neighborhood centers containing markets and other stores catering to
residents' lower order needs. Town centers, consisting of post offices,
cinemas, libraries, creches, hawker centers, and banks, catered to more
specialized needs. New towns contained approximately 25,000 to
50,0000 dwelling units, arranged into 9-story to 13-story "slabs" with
the occasional 4 -story slab and 25-story "point block" for variety.
102
96. Prior to 1960, the SIT had built only 22,113 public housing units. HDB FAcTs, supra
note 5, at 8. Between 1960 and 1967, the HDB constructed 74,500 units. Chang, supra note
70, at 246.
97. Cheng, supra note 63, at 47.
98. It bulk purchased cement, tiles, bathroom parts, etc. In anticipation of future construction,
the HDB stockpiled such essential materials as granite, sand, bricks, squat pans, and wall tiles.
Id. at 49.
99. "Traditionally, Singapore's main source of foreign labor has been Malaysia. Since 1981,
foreign workers have been taken in from other countries." Id. at 51. The government recognized,
however, that importing labor was only a short-term solution to Singapore's labor needs. Id.
100. Id. at 51-53.
101. Experts have compared the new towns to European post-war new towns:
Singapore's new towns are modeled largely upon the European post-war new towns with a
few notable differences. First, the Singapore new towns are planned to accommodate sizable
populations with a large majority of the residents housed in high-rise high-density flats due
to land scarcity. Second the new towns are built to be self-contained.
Eng, supra note 32, at 259.
102. Id. at 260. Gross residential density in the new towns, including all land uses, is 60
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The flats themselves were one-room to five-room units containing a
kitchen and a bathroom. The room types are as follows: "Emergency,"
the lowest-quality of flat; "standard," a slightly larger version of the
emergency flat; "improved," similar to the standard flat with a larger
kitchen; "new generation," containing a kitchen-dining room and store
room; and "Model A," containing the largest rooms. 10 3 The HDB
designed and arranged the flats to foster certain socioeconomic goals.
To encourage creation and maintenance of the nuclear family, the HDB
designed the flats in the "Anglo-American housing model, which is
oriented towards the needs of the conjugal-family household.' 01 4 To
encourage socioeconomic mixing, the HDB arranged the buildings so
that low-quality and high-quality units existed in close proximity.10
To foster satisfaction with public housing, the HDB built social,
recreational, and transportation amenities. 106 The HDB also instituted
an aggressive maintenance policy. It mandated regular and ongoing
maintenance, conducted cyclical preventive maintenance of the build-
ings and mechanical and electrical installations, and undertook major
repairs to the buildings to upgrade older units.
107
H. Eligibility for Public Housing
The Singapore government tailored its strict housing eligibility
requirements to meet various national objectives. 0 8 This is further
dwelling units or 300 persons per hectare. Net density in residential areas alone is 175 dwelling
units or 875 persons per hectare. Eng, supra note 32, at 259-60.
103. When the demand for the smaller, lower-quality flats began to taper off in 1970, the
HDB began constructing four- to five-room "Executive" and "HUDC" flats. The flats range from
a size of 23 square meters for the smallest one-room unit to 162 square meters for the largest
HUDC unit. Tony Tan Keng Joo et al., Physical Planning and Design, in HOUSING A NATION,
supra note 3, at 56, 58-60.
104. HASSAN, supra note 11, at 13. Although Hassan describes the nuclear family as the
"prevailing socio-cultural organization of the family," evidence indicates that shophoue dwellers
were nor all organized into conjugal family units. In fact, it was quite common for both
economically disadvantaged Asians and traditional Asians to have extended family and friends
dwelling in the same house. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. It, therefore, appears that
the Singapore government was trying to actively encourage the formation of nuclear family units.
105. Generally, each floor of an 11- to 12-story slab contains 8-10 flats. The smaller, 4-story
slabs have 12-14 flats on each floor. Each building contains several staircases and elevators and
a central lobby. Joo, supra note 103, at 71.
106. The HDB built several amenities:
[Slwimming complexes, sports complexes and indoor stadiums steadily appear in the estates,
Parks and gardens as well as jogging tracks, keep fit corners and children's playgrounds find
their way into every corner of the housing estates. To meet high parking demands, garages
and specially designated bus and lorry parking lots are provided in addition to open parking
lots. And free ground floor spaces of the residential blocks are converted into education
centres, child-care centres, senior citizens' clubs, community sub-centres, neighbourhood
police posts, offices for the residents' committees and community halls.
Ker, supra note 3, at 13.
107. Id. at 20-21.
108. Chang, supra note 70, at 236.
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evidence of the government's employment of ends-based reasoning-.0 9
For example, in keeping with its strict immigration policies, the
government required all owners and renters to be citizens of Singa-
pore. 110 To prevent profit making from ownership of public housing,
the HDB forbade owners and renters to own any other private residen-
tial property. Even those who gave up their private property to be
eligible for HDB flats had to wait thirty months before gaining eligi-
bility."' The HDB, however, permitted public housing residents to
own commercial property with a value up to $250,000 if that property
was for business use only.11 2 In addition, the HDB tailored its eligi-
bility requirements to emphasize family formation. Renters and owners
had to be at least twenty-one years old. 1 3 Households had to consist
of two or more persons related by blood or marriage. 114 The policy
considerations behind the family-oriented requirements were twofold:
"The republic's limited land for housing development and the social
objective of the government to dissuade young single persons from
living away from their families." 11
Despite the restrictive eligibility requirements, demand for HDB
units has always outweighed supply.116 The average waiting period for
an HDB flat has been three years.117 Two reasons explain why the
demand for the public housing units was so high. First, applicants
knew that many residents were satisfied with the public housing."l l
Second, and more importantly, private property prices have escalated
to astronomical levels during the past few decades. Most Singaporeans
109. The government was willing to subordinate the rights generally associated with owner-
ship and renting to achieve its national objectives.
110. It did, however, allow some factories and institutions such as the National University of
Singapore to rent HDB units and provide them to non-citizen employees. TAi, supra note 14, at
72.
111. Chang, supra note 70, at 240. The government did, however, make exceptions to this
eligibility requirement, upon its discretion, in cases where a person had been bestowed property,
owned property jointly and could not dispose of it or live in it, or owned property in name but
was unable to use the property, such as in the case of rent-controlled premises. Id at 240-41.
112. Ricquier, supra note 2, at 323.
113. HDB FAcrs, supra note 5, at 10.
114. In 1960, the minimum household size for a one-room flat was five persons (related
through blood or marriage). In 1962, the minimum size was reduced to three related persons. In
1967, the requirements were relaxed so that the minimum household size for any flat was two
related persons. In 1978, the government began to allow any two adults, over 40 years old, to
submit a joint application to rent or to purchase one public flat. It also allowed a person planning
to get married to apply to rent a flat with her fianc6. The couple would then have to produce
their marriage certificate within three months after the commencement of the tenancy agreement.
TMA, supra note 14, at 72.
115. Teo Siew-Eng, Patterns of Change in Public Housing in Singapore, 11 TasmD WoRm PLAN.
Rav. 373, 378 (1989).
116. See TAI, supra note 14, at 75. "[Ihe demand for all types of public housing.., is always
much greater than the supply. This phenomenon has not changed since the inception of the HDB
in 1960, although the number of applications has fluctuated from time to time." Id
117. Id. at 75-76.
118. Id.
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simply could not afford to purchase private housing. 19 Given the
extreme demand for housing, it is not surprising that the Singaporeans
did not express more dissatisfaction with the restrictive terms of their
public housing occupancy.
I. Low-Income Aspects
To achieve the goal of eradicating homelessness and slums, the HDB
concentrated on making public housing available to low-income Sin-
gaporeans. Specifically, the HDB endeavored to aid low-income people
in renting the smaller emergency units. To ensure lower price units
would be available to low-income families, the HDB placed an income
ceiling on eligibility for renting the units. For example, in 1962,
families earning above $250 per month were not eligible for one-room
flats. 120 The HDB also placed an income ceiling on eligibility for
purchasing the units.
121
In addition, the HDB encouraged low-income families to own their
flats. Professor Teo Siew-Eng of the National University of Singapore
explained the importance of home ownership:
The rationale behind home-ownership is obvious. Ownership brings
with it a certain sense of security, gives root to a population, and
ensures the long-term stability of society. Home-ownership has,
in fact, instilled an element of pride among owners as seen in the
willingness of many flat dwellers to spend vast sums of money in
renovating and decorating their flats. 122
To help rental tenants own their flats, the HDB offered the flats at
discounts of 30% off the selling price or $10,000, whichever was lower.
119. Id.
120. Chang, supra note 70, at 244. After 1980, the income requirement was an income of less
than $500 per month for a one-room to two-room flat and less than $800 per month for a
three-room flat. TAI, supra note 14, at 73. As of 1995, rent for a one-room flat was $26-$33 and
for a two room flat is $44-$75. HDB FACTs, supra note 5, at 11. This is less than the prices of
the flats in 1989, which were $25-40 and $50-80, respectively. TAI, supra note 14, at 83,
These figures are not meaningful unless one considers that the current average gross monthly
income of each employed person is $2,086 per month. Families making only $500 per month
are easily considered low-income. As of 1995, per capita income was $28,820. This is up from
$14,435 in 1986 and $1,330 in 1960. HDB FACrS, supra note 5, at 11.
121. For example, after 1980, the income ceiling for purchasing a three- to five-room flat was
between $3,000 and $6,000 per month. TM, supra note 14, at 73.
122. Eng, rupra note 115, at 378. Experts in the United States have echoed this view,
observing that where people have less of stake in their property and more mobility, rate of
deterioration of the property increases. See, &g., WILLIaM WHEATON, URBN HOUSING 231-60
(1966). But see HASSAN, supra note 11, at 200-05 (revealing that HDB residents, in fact, did not
take pride in their units, but rather felt apathetic and resigned to their housing conditions). See
also infra text accompanying note 184.
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Renters could obtain a mortgage loan of up to 100% of the discounted
price to help finance the purchase. The HDB also offered to sell
three-room and four-room flats to low-income families at subsidized
prices.
23
Furthermore, the Home Ownership Financing Scheme, instituted in
1964, helped all families to own their flats. It permitted citizens to
use a portion of the CPF to pay for down payments or mortgages on
HDB units.124 Singaporeans could use up to 30% of their portions of
the CPF to finance home ownership. 12' In 1981, the government
introduced the Home Protection Insurance Scheme. It ensured that
dependents of sole breadwinners would not lose their homes as a result
of default in loan repayments due to the death or permanent incapacity
of the sole breadwinner.
126
J. Market Controls
To ensure continued occupancy of public housing units, the govern-
ment severely restricted the free operation of Singapore's housing mar-
kets. As stated earlier, HDB owners and renters could not own property
for appreciation or rental income, nor could they gratuitously transfer
property interest without restriction. 127 HDB residents also did not
enjoy the same opportunities for mobility as private-market owners.
128
Flat owners could only sell to private citizens in the secondary market
under two conditions: The owner resided in the flat for at least two
years; and the owner waited at least thirty months after the sale to
123. The HDB bought back three-room flats from the secondary market and sold them at
subsidized prices to families with incomes of $1,000 or less. Hous. &Dav. BD., PUBLIc HOUSING
IN SINGAPORE 1, 4-5. (1995); see infra notes 129-131 and accompanying text for a description
of the secondary marker. To help low-income families buy four-room flats, the HDB would offer
them an emergency, lower-quality four-room flat, which, at 90 square meters, was a bit smaller
than other four-room flats at a price 15-18% lower than the other flats. Hous. & DEv. BD.,
supra.
124. As discussed earlier, the CPF is Singapore's equivalent of the U.S. Social Security Fund.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
125. Ker, supra note 3, at 12. The HDB explained:
Today, with the contribution rare of 25 percent payable by the employer and the employee
respectively, a person with a scarring salary of $500 per month increasing at 6 percent per
year, would have accumulated CPF savings of over half a million Singapore dollars after
thirty years of working. At this rate of savings, most Singaporeans have no difficulty in
buying public housing flats using CPF contributions for monthly repayments ....
Id.
126. Chang, supra note 70, at 234.
127. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
128. Chang, supra note 70, at 235-36. Singapore has a tiny, consumer-driven market. Id But
see Teo Siew-Eng, Why Singaporeans Move---A Profile of Movers in HDB Flats and Private Housing,
7 AsIAN PROFILE 379, 379-88 (1979) (showing that HDB flat dwellers changed their flats once
every 6.7 years, private flat dwellers once every 7.1 years, and private house dwellers every 9.1
years). Therefore, in reality, HDB dwellers were more mobile rather than less mobile.
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apply for a new flat.129 So long as these conditions were satisfied, an
owner could sell either a flat bought directly from the HDB or a flat
purchased on the secondary market. 130 Moreover, the government re-
stricted the free operation of the secondary market by imposing a levy
on the private sale of public housing units.
131
K Renters and Owners
At this point, the difference between renters and owners may not
be apparent. In, part, this is because there was no substantive difference
between renters and owners in terms of property rights and entitle-
ments. Under the Housing and Development Act, both renters and
owners could be ousted basically at the discretion of the HDB. 132 As
Professor Ricquier observed:
It should be apparent already that buying a home in Singapore is,
at least for the vast majority of the population, quite unlike
buying a home in most places where the English legal system, in
some shape or form, has taken root. Basically, the contractual
element, in any real sense, has been removed. The process is more
akin to applying for a license for some privilege. This is really not
surprising, because that is precisely how public housing is re-
garded.
133
In addition, owners neither enjoyed free and clear alienation rights, nor
the ability to freely transfer property either for value or as a gift. They
also did not enjoy the benefits of capital appreciation. 134 Indeed, the
concept of market appreciation was foreign to the HDB housing re-
gime. The HDB controlled flat prices. Prices were based upon con-
struction costs and availability of funding rather than market de-
mands.1
35
So why would anyone want to become an owner when ownership
accrued no more property rights but presumably brought more finan-
129. Chang, supra note 70, at 235-36. Similarly, ex-private property owners were barred from
applying for 30 months. These conditions have been in place since 1970. The original HDB
policy toward resale was that an owner who wished to dispose of his flat could only sell it back
to the HDB at the original purchase price minus depreciation. Id
130. In 1982, the HDB permitted owners to sell only their first HDB flat on the open market.
In 1985, the HDB began to allow owners of HDB flats bought on the secondary market to sell
after a period of 30 months. Id.
131. In 1982, the HDB imposed a levy of 10% on the resale price of three-room flats, 15%
on four-room flats, and 20% on five-room flats. The levy rules were relaxed in 1985, so that only
sellers of flats bought directly from HDB had to pay a 10% levy. Id at 236.
132. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
133. Ricquier, supra note 2, at 321.
134. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
135. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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cial responsibility? The answer is simple: As part of its goal of making
housing available to low-income families, the HDB severely limited
its rental market. The HDB made the rental option available only to
the small portion of society that could not afford to buy, even with the
subsidy programs available to them. To that end, it made rental units
available to three classes of families: Families whose total income was
not more than $800/month; "transitional" families who had booked
flats and were awaiting occupancy; and families in the flat upgrading
program who were awaiting occupancy of their upgraded flats. Finally,
the HDB rented to qualified non-citizens in the housing program (for
example, university students).136 The remainder of HDB residents became
part of the Home Ownership Financing Scheme described earlier.
L. External Social, Political, and Demographic Factors
A number of independent government programs and existing social
characteristics contributed to the apparent success of Singapore's hous-
ing program. These factors are peculiar to Singapore, arguably making
Singapore's housing success unique.
137
1. Integration
To prevent housing and other problems created by racial division,
138
the government implemented a massive campaign of racial integration.
Singapore is an ethnically diverse nation with one dominant ethnic
group, the Chinese.139 Prior to the government's policy of active inte-
gration, the different ethnic groups experienced different socioeco-
nomic statuses.140 The government felt that deliberately manipulating
the arrangement of public housing would help achieve racial integra-
tion. "One of the main objectives of Singapore's public housing pro-
gram [was] to bring people of all ethnic groups to live together in a
planned environment with the hope of promoting ethnic integra-
tion."'14 Apparently, the government succeeded in integrating housing.
136. HDB FACTs, supra note 5, at 11.
137. See HASSAN, szpra note 11, at 10 (observing that "some of [Singapore's features] are
peculiar to Singapore and render Singapore's public housing programme somewhat unique and
less likely to serve as a model for other neighboring countries").
138. In the United States, for example, housing problems are often associated with racial
problems. See generally ARNOLD R. HIRSCH & RAYMOND A. MOHL, URBAN POLICY IN TWENTI-
ETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1993).
139. Seventy-eight percent of Singapore's population is Chinese, 14% is Malay, 795 is Indian,
and the remaining 19 consists of other groups. HDB FACTS, supra note 5, at 2.
140. The Chinese, like Caucasians in the United States, enjoyed the highest class in society.
The Indians were lower-class, but mostly known as urban dwellers. The Malays experienced the
lowest status. They were known as "kampong" (village) dwellers. TAi, supra note 14, at 23.
141. Id
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Surveys show that 53% of Singaporeans believe their present neigh-
borhoods are more integrated than previous ones.142 The active inte-
gration program has not met with universal praise. Many criticize it
on the grounds that the uniform housing and mixed environment has
destroyed culture. Others simply argue that ethnic separation is main-
tained on a different level. One commentator noted:
[In a multi-cultural society like Singapore, different ethnic groups
maintain and practice their own values and norms, and in some
instances the different norms and practices may clash with one
another; what is moral or sacred to one group may be despised or
taboo to another. Consequently, ethnic boundaries are maintained
and the intensity of inter-ethnic interaction is therefore much
lower than that of intra-ethnic interaction.
43
2. Education and Propaganda
To ensure contentment with public housing, the Singapore govern-
ment educated its constituents about socialized living. In order to
directly communicate social values to the public, the HDB launched
Our Home magazine. Our Home magazine now enjoys the largest circu-
lation among all journals in Singapore. 14 4 The HDB also communi-
cated with the public through several grass roots organizations. In
addition, the government began using schools to orient children to-
wards certain social and moral values. The government introduced into
all schools a moral education program based on both Confucian ethics
and government policy goals "to promote the awareness and the prac-
tice of moral and traditional values among Singaporeans." 145 Such
propaganda and education programs have not been viewed favorably
by all. One critic stated: "Socialization through mass media and the
schools has successfully convinced the bulk of the population that there
are no alternative methods or policies workable for Singapore's eco-
nomic survival." 146 This may be viewed as another example of Singa-
pore employing ends-based reasoning. The government used propa-
ganda, a means viewed unfavorably by many, to achieve its housing
ends.
142. id. at 141. Thirty percent think the level of integration remains the same. Id
143. Id at 144; cf infra notes 227-228 and accompanying text.
144. Ker, supra note 3, at 24.
145. TAI, srpra note 14, at 113.
146. Chan Heng Chee, The Political System and Political Change, in SINGAPORE: SOCrY IN
TRANSITION 1, 38 (Riaz Hassan ed., 1976).
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3. Population Control
To ensure that the population would not exceed available housing
and land, the government initiated programs to curb population growth.
In 1965, the government implemented the Family Planning Program,
a comprehensive family planning service and program of incentives and
disincentives to discourage large family formation.147 As disincentives,
families with three children or more were cut from state welfare and
forced to wait longer for public housing. Furthermore, mothers in these
families were not eligible for maternity leave. These families also paid
higher maternity hospitalization costs and primary schooling fees. 148
As incentives, the government made contraceptives widely available,
offered abortions for nominal fees, and induced sterilization by offering
women an extra week of vacation if they agreed to be sterilized. 149
By 1980, 10% of Singapore's women of child-bearing age had been
sterilized. By 1975, population growth had slowed to 1.3%, as com-
pared with 5.4% in 1957.150 The program worked so well that the
HDB had to modify its housing projections because of the drastic
decline in population growth rates. 151 The program, arguably, worked
too well. Combined with the growth of the job market due to tech-
nological advances and increased investment, population reduction lead
to labor shortages and the need to import human capital from Malaysia
and other surrounding countries. 52 Even so, the Singapore government
generally did not permit the foreign workers to live in Singapore.
Experts continue to describe Singapore's international immigration
policies as "extremely selective."'
153
4. Organizing Labor to Attract Foreign Investment
At the same time it was building public housing, the Singapore
government was attempting to create a social environment attractive
to foreign investors. The government took political steps to make labor
more efficient and quash labor unrest.154 These policies, while arguably
147. PETER S.J. CHEN & TAi CHING LING, SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF SINGAPORE 25 (1977).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Hird, supra note 8, at 38.
151. TAz, supra note 14, at 49.
152. See Cheng, supra note 63, at 51.
153. HASSAN, supra note 11, at 12. This restrictive policy was also reflected in the provisions
of the Housing and Development Act that restrict HDB residents from aiding illegal aliens in
any way. See supra note 57.
154. In 1968, the legislature passed two labor-related Acts: The Employment Act and the
Industrial Relations Act. The Employment Act increased the hours of work per week for white
collar workers, restricted bonus payments based on performance, and reduced public holidays.
The Industrial Relations Act provided that collective agreements could not supersede terms of
the Employment Act. It also increased the Minister of Labor's discretionary power over industrial
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violative of employment rights, succeeded in boosting the economy.
As one analyst noted: "With the backing of a pool of well-organized
labour, an efficient organizational and administrative system, and a
series of well-designed infrastructures, investment capital [was) at-
tracted, and the industrial sector gradually emerge[dl."'155
In 1967, the government passed the Export Expansion Incentives
Act, which offered considerable tax incentives to newly established
foreign and domestic industries. 156 The government exempted new
companies that "contribute[d] to the Singapore economy" from the
standard 40% tax on company profits for five years.1 57 These labor and
investment policies paid off, resulting in a tenfold increase in foreign
investment between 1965 and 1971.158 Between 1960 and 1984, Sin-
gapore's per capita domestic GNP also grew tenfold. 159
5. Other External Characteristics
A number of other characteristics appear to have contributed to
Singapore's housing achievements. First, Singapore experienced virtu-
ally no rural-to-urban migration.1 60 Rural-to-urban migration often
transfers poverty from rural areas to cities. 161 Without such a transfer,
the government could better predict and meet housing needs. Second,
Singapore was predominantly an urbanized country. In 1970, only
about 4.1% of the labor force worked in agriculture.162 This enabled
the government to invest all housing and development funds in urban
areas. Third, until 1970, Singapore spent almost nothing on defense.
This further liberated the government to invest a substantial portion
of government funds in housing during the formative years of the
housing program). 63 Finally, prior to the initiation of the public hous-
ing program, citizens were accustomed to living in high-density con-
ditions. This facilitated their acceptance of the high-density housing
disputes and limited workers' rights to strike. Hird, supra note 8, at 25. This is yet another
example of Singapore's willingness to subordinate individual rights in the quest for an efficient
system.
155. DESMOND P. PEREIRA, Focus ON ENVIRONMENT 14 (1979).
156. Hird, supra note 8, at 28-29.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Ker, supra note 3, at 26.
160. Id. at 11-12.
161. In the United States, this phenomenon occurred when Southern rural African Americans
migrated to Northern urban areas, creating scarcity in certain housing markets. Ste gencrally
DANIEL R. FusFELD & TIMOTHY BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN GHETTO
(1984). The authors argue, however, that the analysis is not as simple as poor blacks moving
poverty into wealthy, urban areas. The effects of discrimination, artificially high rents, and
opportunistic real estate agents lead to urban ghetto pathologies. Id
162. P. ARUMAINATHAN, REPORT ON THE CENSUS OF POPULATION 1970 SINGAPORE 96 tbl.
8.25 (Singapore Dep' of Stat. vol. 1, 1970).
163. HASSAN, suipra note 11, at 12.
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units available from the HDB.'64 This attitude is evidenced by the
notable absence of vandalism of the housing units. As one author
stated: "Another credit which should be given to the residents is their
cooperation in looking after the properties. The incidence of vandalism
has been relatively low.'
65
III. RESULTS OF SINGAPORE'S PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM
A. Tangible Achievements
The results of Singapore's housing program have been nothing short
of extraordinary. As pointed out earlier, the HDB has built 733,471
units since 1960 and currently houses 86% of the population.6 The
government has virtually eliminated slums and homelessness. This
achievement is vividly illustrated by changes in the character of the
downtown area. One observer noted:
In the wake of [existing residents'] departure, the development of
new industry and business has occurred unimpeded in the most
desirable locations in Singapore. Consequently, urban renewal con-
struction projects "have changed the character of downtown Sin-
gapore by replacing slums with high-rise office complexes and
shopping marts."167
During resettlement, the HDB demolished old historical buildings
all over the country and replaced them with new residential and
commercial structures. Many have expressed concern over Singapore
losing its culture and heritage. 168 Although the government set up a
committee on the preservation of historical monuments, it eventually
cleared ethnic and historical landmarks, such as the entire Chinatown
area, to make way for HDB development. 169
The housing policy also generally affected the economy. It created
vast employment opportunities. Housing construction employed 6.3%
of Singapore's total work force. 170 By the 1970s, Singapore had achieved
full employment by international standards. 171 As noted earlier, Singa-
164. Id. at 15.
165. Ker, supra note 3, at 26.
166. HDB FAcrs, supra note 5, at 2, 8.
167. Hird, supra note 8, at 47 (quoting NENA VREELAND ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR
SINGAPORE 111 (1977)).
168. "They ask, 'How can we teach our children about their roots if all visible evidence of
[it] is destroyed?"' TM, supra note 14, at 99. A similar type of debate occurs in the United States
concerning ghetto dispersal versus ghetto enrichment. See WILSON, supra note 19; infra notes
227-228 and accompanying text.
169. TAi, supra note 14, at 100.
170. Id. at 94.
171. Id.
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pore's labor needs are currently so great that industries must import
foreign workers must be imported into the country to combat labor
shortages. 172 In addition, experts contend that, by keeping housing
costs low and constant, public housing has served as an "important
subsidy to wages" and has thereby boosted the economy.
17 3
B. Satisfaction with Public Housing
To the outside observer, Singapore looks clean and people are housed,
but are low-income people really any better off than they were living
in slums and shophouses? The HDB conducted surveys concerning the
satisfaction level of HDB residents in 1968, 1973, and 1981.17 4 As
might be expected, the HDB reported mostly favorable results. It
described residents as showing "a fairly high level of satisfaction" and
having a "satisfactory and sound" experience.'75 It observed that satis-
faction levels had been rising since the 1960s due to the government's
commitment to providing better and better housing. 17 6 Although many
residents responded that the conditions in HDB flats were "cleaner" and
"nicer" than before, residents complained that the flats were "too
small," the buildings were "too crowded," and there were "too many
rules and regulations.' 177 Apparently the HDB was not particularly
concerned with whether residents felt, all things considered, better off
than they were before. It was more interested in whether they were
satisfied with their current residences.
178
Moreover, not all studies have shown favorable results. A 1972 study
by lain Buchanan revealed that for many people, "resettlement [was]
a step backward, socially and economically, in their search for secu-
rity." 79 Buchanan explained that former slum residents forced to relo-
cate to HDB flats ended up in buildings with much greater vertical
density and experienced both decreased work opportunity and in-
creased expenditures. 8 0 In other words, to satisfy the government's
desire for a clean, efficient country, Singaporeans were forced to move,
172. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
173. Hird, supra note 8, at 52. Hird also noted, however, that a greater number of Singapore-
ans were below the poverty level in the mid-1970s (35%) than in the mid-1950s (25%) Id at
57.
174. TAI, supra note 14, at 5.
175. Id. at 8 (citing STEPHEN H.K. YEH, PUBLIC HOUSING IN SINGAPORE 337 (1975)),
176. Lim Koon Poh et al., HDB and Its Residents, in HOUSING A NATION, supra note 3, at
375, 396.
177. Id. at 400-05.
178. This is most likely because many former shophouse dwellers, upon comparison, would
have preferred the old style of living. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. The HDB would
not be able to conform public housing units to the dwellers' satisfaction due to their inherent
dissatisfaction with the very nature of public housing.
179. lAIN BUCHANAN, SINGAPORE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
APPRAiSAL 240 (1972).
180. Id. at 241.
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against their wills, to residences that cost more than they wanted to
spend.' 8 ' Thus, even though the government had intended the system
to help low-income families, it actually may have left these families
with a "poorer" quality of life.
A 1977 study by Riaz Hassan highlighted many of the negative
outcomes of the housing program. First, Hassan discovered that reset-
tlement had severe psychological effects on HDB residents. He ex-
plained that "when people areforced to change their residence, the
result, under certain circumstances, is a 'grief syndrome."' ' 2 He de-
scribed this syndrome as a "psychosomatic condition that may include
intestinal disorders, nausea, vomiting, and crying spells over an ex-
tended period of time."'
18 3
He also observed that many of the resident-respondents expressed
distress that they had no control over their housing situations and felt
that the HDB only helped the "well off." Hassan noted:
Many felt that they were stuck with what they had. Those affected
by urban renewal felt that they were powerless and had to take
what the Government offered. In their former homes, they could
rear pigs, chicken and ducks to subsidize their incomes. With
urban renewal they felt they had been forced out of their former
residence with no power to resist. When asked if they had sought
aid from the Government, many did not know what help to ask
for.1'
4
In addition, Hassan observed that recreational outings were rare
since people could no longer afford them. He also showed that the
lower-income people in HDB flats did not always upgrade their con-
ditions after resettlement. Although former Chinatown residents gen-
erally found the HDB flats to be cleaner, rural resettlers "seemed to
miss their cleaner, quieter former homes."'185 Finally, Hassan observed
a low standard of living and education among the residents. He ex-
plained that because of the capital required to maintain HDB resi-
dency, residents could think about little else outside of what occurred
in the immediate household.' 6
181. In the United States, the anti-paternalist argument that people should be free to pay less
for inadequate housing if they so desire is often produced against compulsory terms in leases, and
more specifically, the nondisclaimable implied warranty of habitability. See Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, witb Special Reference to Compulsory Tnes
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L REv. 563, 657 (1982).
182. HASSAN, stora note 11, at 18.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 203.
185. Id. at 205.
186. Id. at 210-11.
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Another way the housing system may have hurt the least well off
was by cementing them in their situations of poverty. The income
ceiling portion of the HDB's low-income assistance program applied
only to the worst-quality units.187 This maintained the poor in their
lower class statuses and, in turn, lowered their aspirations and educa-
tional achievements. As one analyst noted:
The crowded conditions in HDB housing and the existing poverty
have led to severe constraints on the chances of the children, who,
as a result of poor studying environments and the constant need
for more household income, prematurely (leave] the education
system to take low-paid jobs. 88
IV. ANALYSIS OF SINGAPORE'S PUBLIC HOUSING
PROGRAM
As evidenced by the divergent analyses of Singapore's housing pro-
gram, experts are divided on the desirability, expediency, and propriety
of many aspects of the program. Inherent in these criticisms and
justifications are "means-based" and "ends-based" reasoning. The Sin-
gapore government foremost has employed ends-based reasoning to
justify the methods it used to achieve its housing goals. 189
A. Means-Based and Ends-Based Reasoning
Broadly speaking, the two most common forms of criticism against
social programs are, stated in a colloquial way, either that "they are
unjust" or "they do not work." These criticisms represent means-based
and ends-based reasoning, respectively. 190 People who engage in means-
based reasoning attack or praise a system based on the means it uses
to achieve an ends. This encompasses the justness of the legal regime,
implementation methods, and values inherent in the system. 19 1 In the
United States housing policy context, means-based reasoning is often
187. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
188. Hird, supra note 8, at 59.
189. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
190. This shows that people criticize systems according to logical forms even if they do not
know they are using them. Means-based arguments are also known as "deontological" arguments,
and ends-based arguments are known as "teleological" arguments.
191. Means-based reasoning can be observed in the work of philosophers like Kant and Rawls,
See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRAcncAL REASON AND OTHER 'WRITINGS IN MORAL
PHImOSOPHY (Lewis W. Beck trans., 1959), reprinted in ETHICAL THEORiES: A BOOK OF RnAD-
INGS 317 (A.I. Melden ed., 2d ed. 1967). Kant uses means-based reasoning when he posits the
"categorical imperative," which states, "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at
the same time will that it should become a universal law." Id. at 339. He is saying that there
are certain behaviors and values that are moral independently of the ends they achieve. Rawls,
likewise, recognizes a certain "overlapping consensus" of values latent in the public political
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used against legal services centers who pursue eviction-free zone strate-
gies. 192 The argument is that legal service centers, by vigorously en-
forcing the warranty of habitability as an anti-eviction measure, are
using immoral, or at least improper, methods to achieve the positive
goal of housing the poor.193 Such arguments do not analyze the result
of the policies but merely the morality of the policies themselves.
Ends-based arguments, on the other hand, analyze both whether a
certain policy has achieved its desired goal and whether the goal was
expedient enough to justify the methods used. 194 In the United States
housing context, empiricists employ ends-based reasoning to attack or
praise various policies. 195 To them, the ultimate barometer of whether
or not a housing policy has succeeded is whether or not it has achieved
its proposed goal.
196
Singapore, for the most part, employed ends-based reasoning to
justify the methods used to create and implement its public housing
program. It reasoned that preexisting conditions were so bad and
current conditions are so good that the methods used were necessary
and justified. 197 There are both ends-based and means-based responses
to this argument. The ends-based responses contest the premise that
preexisting conditions were that bad and that current conditions are
culture that are justified independently of the ends they achieve. See generally Jom RAwws,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1992).
192. See Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones: The Economics of Legal Bricolage in the Fight
Against Displacement, 18 FORDHA URB. LJ. 507 (1991). Kolodney explains:
The point of the strategy is to launch a form of legal guerrilla warfare. Hence, it may be
said that an EFZ [Eviction Free Zone] uses "legal bricolage," in the sense that the lawyer
uses any legal means at hand to bring about the desired result of increasing the time and
expense needed to evict tenants. Rather than employing the IWH [implied warranty of
habitability] and other defenses in only those cases where the defense is likely to succeed,
the strategy is to mount a legal defense in all cases with a colorable claim .... The goal
is to force landlords to hack down before the eviction can be brought to a full trial, or, at
least, make each eviction as costly as possible.
Id. at 518.
193. Id.
194. Ends-based reasoning is best illustrated by the works of Thomas Hobbes. See THOMAS
HOBBES, LEviATHAN (1841), reprinted in ETHICAL THEORIES: A BOOK OF READINGS, snpra note
191, at 218. Hobbes felt that the state of nature was so bad ("and the life of a man, solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short") that it justified the creation of an absolute dictator to give order
to society. Id. at 223.
195. See, eg., Kolodney, supra note 192, at 520. He illustrates a particular ends-based critique
of eviction free zone strategies: "Neoclassical economists generally maintain that enforcement of
the warranty which imposes extraneous costs on landlords produces a negative supply effect in
the affordable housing market." Id.
196. Various philosophers have debated whether or not means-based reasoning should super-
sede ends-based reasoning or vice versa. See, eg., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863).
This Recent Development does not attempt to tackle the debate between deontology and
teleology. The distinction is used only to clarify how a certain housing policy is likely to be
analyzed.
197. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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that good. The means-based responses contend that even if the results
of the system are positive, they do not justify the abusive means used
to achieve those results.
198
B. Singapore's Ends-Based Defense of Public Housing and Ends-Based
Responses
Most experts agree that the Singapore public housing program
worked. 99 Critics even agree with the government that the means used
to implement the program may have been necessary given the preex-
isting conditions. Thomas Michael Hird observed:
In all fairness, criticism of Singapore's public housing efforts should
not occur without some qualifying expressions of admiration.
Thirty years ago in Singapore, the conditions faced by a young
PAP government were vastly different than those presented in the
modern city-state .... In a means-versus-end analysis, given its
starting point and the alternatives so vividly illustrated by other
countries in the region, perhaps the authoritarian posture and
practices of the PAP are validated in that Singapore provides its
residents with what so many others lack.
200
Critics, however, are quick to point out that Singapore's housing
achievements may not have been as positive as the government would
like people to believe. First, they contend that the system did not work
to benefit those who most needed the system's help.201 Evidence shows
that the system actually may have served to hurt the poorest segment
of the population.20 2 By offering only the lowest-quality emergency
units to the low-income residents, the HDB effectively reinforced those
residents' situations of poverty.203 Moreover, as Hassan discovered, many
residents ended up in worse housing conditions after resettlement.
20 4
In addition, critics assert that the HDB's programs forced residents
to pay more than they wished for housing.205 This, in turn, gave them
less money to spend on other things like education, entertainment, and
basic needs. Essentially, the residents had a "poorer" lifestyle. In the
198. See, ag., Hird, supra note 8.
199. See, ag., Ricquier, .rupra note 2.
200. Hird, supra note 8, at 69.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 180-188.
202. Id.
203. Hird, snpra note 8, at 69. Houing problems like this can be observed in the United
States, where public houing projects give rise to pathologies that exacerbate rather than lessen
residents' impoverished conditions. See generally WILSON, supra note 22.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 183-186.
205. See BUCHANAN, supra note 179.
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United States, a similar criticism arises in the context of the nondis-
claimable implied warranty of habitability. Critics argue:
[Liandlords will pass along some of the increased maintenance
costs generated by the warranty, so that rents will go up. Tenants
will be forced to purchase more amenity than they want; they will
pay more for less housing . . . . Attempts to improve their situ-
ation by paternalistic interference with their freedom of choice
supposedly just make matters worse.
20 6
One could respond to this criticism in two ways. 207 On the means-
based level, one could assert paternalistically that the government (or
intellectual elites, as the case may be) should determine for low-income
(and, presumably, less educated) people what they should value. In
other words, one may assert that the poor should spend a larger
percentage of their income on better housing instead of choosing to
live in squalid conditions. Harvard Law School Professor Duncan Ken-
nedy has observed that "there may be a strong paternalist case in favor
of the warranty if it turns out that eliminating very bad units, forcing
marginally higher densities in better maintained conditions, has long-
term beneficial effects on poor families." 2°8 On the empirical level, one
could simply argue that the implied warranty of habitability does not
have the effect of making tenants pay more than they are willing for
housing.
Returning to the Singapore context, the HDB argues paternalisti-
cally that they had the expertise to determine the kind of system that
would most benefit its residents. They assert that the government
legitimately decided to improve the condition of its constituents. 0 9
The HDB, however, has a harder time defending against the empirical
criticism. Unlike the warranty of habitability, whose empirical results
depend on its effect on a private market, the HDB has controlled the
market. In other words, because United States housing markets con-
tinue to function independently, the warranty of habitability may be
able to create better housing without forcing residents to pay more
than they are willing for housing. In Singapore, however, the HDB
actually set housing prices and controlled residential densities. The
206. Duncan Kennedy, The Effert of the Warranty of Habitability of Low Income Houing: "Milking"
and Class Violence, 15 FL. ST. U. L. REv. 485, 497 (1987) (citing Hirsch, Hirsch, & Margolis,
Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the
Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 CA1.. L REv. 1098, 1116-24 (1975)).
207. This does not imply that only two responses exist. These responses are merely examples
of means-based and ends-based responses to the argument. For a more complete discussion of the
warranty, see generally id
208. Id. at 498 (citing Duncan Kennedy, supra note 181, at 624-49 (1982)).
209. Yong, supra note 86, at 319.
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market could not compensate for the fact that housing prices were
generally higher than what the poorest residents desired to pay.
210
Moreover, critics contend that, in addition to the "grief syndrome"
caused by resettlement, 211 high-density living in the HDB flats caused
a host of other problems. 212 These criticisms, however, apply to any
system in which there is displacement and high-density, not just
Singapore's system. Notwithstanding the particular objections to the
HDB's method of clearing residents, if clearing had to occur, escaping
the effects of resettlement would be impossible. Moreover, avoiding the
downfalls of high-density living was impractical, given Singapore's size
and population.
C. Means-Based Criticisms of Public Housing
The first aspect of the program that can be criticized under a
means-based approach is the government's prioritization of housing.
The Singapore government felt that "making housing a top priority"
was an indispensable step toward national prosperity.213 Critics could
counter that public housing should not have been regarded so highly
by the government. They point out that Singapore has not traditionally
spent much on defense, a program whose maintenance many people in
the United States would consider absolutely necessary.214 Critics could
also assert that housing problems are simply income problems. They
could argue that the real social dilemma is poverty, not inadequate
housing, and that redistributing income more evenly eventually would
have solved the low-income housing problems.
215
Conversely, some critics argue that the Singapore government did
not respect the value of housing enough. They assert that because of
the various restrictions on freedom within the housing units and the
tenuous position of HDB residents as tenants, the government deni-
grated individual property rights. Ricquier observed:
It should be noted that [according to the Singapore government)
there is no duty to provide housing as such, in the sense of a legal
concept carrying with it the corollary of individuals being able to
210. BUcHANAN, supra note 179, at 241.
211. See HAssAN, supra note 11, at 18.
212. See BucH.t,, supra note 179, at 241.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 23-35.
214. See HAssAN, supra note 11, at 12. When told that Singapore spends up to 50% of the
government's budget on public housing, a peer replied, "How will they defend themselves?"
215. The Singapore government does not attempt to redistribute income. In fact, critics point
out that the low-income housing system actually served to maintain the worst off in their
positions of poverty. See Hird, supra note 8, at 59. In the U.S. context, WILSON, uupra note 19,
advocates an income-distribution type of policy. He favors a subsidized jobs program for inner-city
African American males, rather than housing resettlement or demand-side housing policies. Id.
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claim a right to be housed. It is indeed a lynch-pin of the Gov-
ernment's approach to the question that public housing is a privi-
lege and not a right.
216
The government, on the other hand, responds that it was justified
in placing housing as a top priority. It holds that the most important
step in establishing Singapore as a developed, prosperous, stable nation
was ensuring that the bulk of the population had sufficient housing.
217
Critics also craft means-based arguments against the government's
broad takings power.218 They find the lack of procedural protections
against government takings objectionable. They object to the fact that
the HDB was not required under statute or constitution to compensate
former owners of acquired land, but did so only by choice. 219 The Land
Acquisition Act provided for no check on the government's power to
acquire private land.220 For the most part, the government had discre-
tion to do as it pleased with the land. Moreover, if the government
had intended to provide a fair market price for the land, the legislature
could have specified so in the Land Acquisition Act.
The government insists that the notice and appeals provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act provided adequate procedural due process. 221
Critics, however, note the lack of public scrutiny over these appeals
and argue that, in reality, the government compulsorily acquired vast
quantities of land, paying less than market value.
222
Critics also advance means-based arguments against the govern-
ment's resettlement policies. These objections pinpoint the problems
of a forced, comprehensive housing program. Foremost, resettled resi-
dents had no real freedom of choice over where to live.223 Although
the government argues that residents could have resorted to the private
housing market, most had no real opportunity to do so. HDB policies
forced market housing prices to rise so high that no resettler could
afford to buy or rent on the private market. This created a situation
where residents were forced to spend more money on housing (to live
in HIDB units) than they would have had markets not been affected
and their land not been seized by the government.224
216. Ricquier, supra note 2, at 319.
217. See YEUNG, supra note 28, at 169.
218. See Ricquier, supra note 2, at 317 (stating that "Itlhe breadth of the acquisition power
is one notable feature of the Act").
219. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
221. Cheng, supra note 63, at 42.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 86-95.
224. See TA!, supra note 14, at 72; HAssAN, supra note 11, at 18. A similar occurrence took
place in the United States when African Americans migrated from the South. Although, techni-
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Moreover, critics object to the government paternalistically deciding
for the people how and where they would live. Singapore's system
differs from a low-income housing project or voucher system in the
United States in that low-income Singaporeans are forced to live in the
housing projects. Vouchers and housing programs in the United States
give low-income people the option to live in better housing without
paying more than they are willing to for housing.225 Consequently,
even if they would not have chosen to spend the money on housing
had they been given cash,226 at least they are not forced to pay more
for housing than before. They still have the choice not to use vouchers
and not to live in projects. They can choose to live in conditions worse
that those found in subsidized or government housing. The Singapore-
ans had no choice but to accept this government "service" even if they
did not want it.
In addition, critics argue that the government used objectionable
means when it dispersed residents without any attempt to preserve the
cultural norms of the affected communities. 227 A similar means-based
argument is encountered in the United States housing context with
regard to ghetto dispersal versus ghetto enrichment. Some experts go
so far as to argue that blindly integrationist policies hurt minorities
by preventing them from achieving solidarity and political power.228
The Singapore government, on the other hand, maintains the impor-
tance of the residents being Singaporean first and Chinese, Malay, or
Indian second. It contends that integration was a necessary precondi-
tion to a stable living environment in the public housing units.
229
Finally, analysts raise means-based arguments against the govern-
ment's treatment of HDB residents. Tenants and even owners have
virtually no secure rights to their units. The Housing and Develop-
ment Act gave almost absolute discretion to the government to reac-
quire units.230 Of course, the government did not have the goal of
cally, there was a free private housing market, racism effectively excluded them from all but a
few areas of the city. This, in turn, artificially drove up prices in those areas. African Americans,
therefore, ended up paying more than they would have had the market operated normally. Sce
FusFs'D & BATES, supra note 161, at 28.
225. Some housing analysts, however, contend that U.S. voucher and housing projects actually
raise rents for nonrecipients, thereby forcing the nonrecipients to either pay more or try to get
into the programs. See generally William C. Apgar, Jr., Which Housing Policy Is Buet?, 1 HOUSING
POLICY DEBATE 1 (1992).
226. Id.
227. See TAI, supra note 14, at 99.
228. See Martha Mahoney, Law and Racial Geography: Public Homing and the Economy in New
Orleans, 42 STANFORD L. Ray. 1251, 1264-65 (1990) (stating that "scholars . . . criticize
integration for neglecting the right of the black community to continue to receive subsidized
housing and for overlooking the necessity of black solidarity to political power").
229. See TAI, supra note 14, at 23.
230. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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creating more homelessness or randomly evicting tenants. Rather, the
likelihood of eviction had the effect of making tenants complacent and
unlikely to ask for better conditions.231 On a more fundamental level,
many view property as something more than a gift from the govern-
ment that can be given or taken at will. Ownership should entitle one
to certain rights and a certain level of security. Property rights should
not be subject to disposal at the government's discretion.
232
V. CONCLUSION
On the surface, Singapore's public housing program may seem at-
tractive as a model upon which to base other public housing programs.
Singapore has eradicated slums and homelessness and has put spotless
high rises where there once was squalor. There are several aspects of
the system, however, that make it unattractive as a model of public
housing, especially for the United States. First, Singapore's system is
the product of a unique legal and political structure. United States
legislatures would not likely pass such broad statutes, and United
States politicians would not likely make housing a top priority in their
political platforms. Singapore's public housing success was also the
product of unique economic, social, and demographic conditions that
do not currently exist in any other country. Moreover, experts disagree
on whether or not Singaporeans are better off with public housing.
Finally, and most importantly, the government achieved its housing
goals using means many in the United States would find objectionable.
In its quest for the perfect public housing regime, the Singapore
government subordinated many of the rights and freedoms people in
the United States associate with property ownership, rights and free-
doms with which most would be reluctant to part.
Aya Gruber*
231. Riaz Hassan reported:
When questioned about their satisfaction and dissatisfaction, many respondents showed that
they took what they had for granted and felt powerless to make any changes . . . . The
respondents generally felt that they were stuck with the space they were living in and the
facilities provided ....
HAssMA, supra note 11, at 203-04.
232. See Ricquier, supra note 2, at 319.
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